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Introduction
It is simply impossible for a judge to do nothing but judge; a legisla-
tor to do nothing but legislate; a governor to do nothing but execute 
the laws.  The proper exercise of each of these three great powers of 
government necessarily includes some ancillary inherent capacity to 
do things which are normally done by the other departments.1
—Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Brennan
1. Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 20–21, 172 
N.W.2d 436 (1969).
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Concern with court funding is nothing new.  What stands out as 
new is the role of monetary sanctions in commentary about, research 
on, and advocacy efforts related to court funding.  Indeed, a brief history 
of how practitioners2 and scholars frame court funding and its interplay 
with monetary sanctions shows clear shifts in perspective over time.  The 
nature of these shifts illuminates the role concern over court funding 
played in the aggressively expanded use of monetary sanctions.  Because 
of courts’ pivotal position in sustaining the system of fines and fees, clar-
ity on courts’ relationship to these sanctions is valuable for advancing 
more equitable policy as well as effective reform efforts.  To that end, 
this essay offers a reflection on how court funding has been framed over 
the years, suggesting that the successive centering of the law, money, and 
people characterizes three distinct phases of concern with court funding.
The first of these phases centers on the law, reflecting how court 
funding has long been anchored in the U.S. Constitution’s inherent pow-
ers doctrine.  As Justice Brennan’s quote above suggests, courts have 
authority to pursue self-preservation via secured funding insofar as 
doing so is necessary to execute their constitutional functions.  Mone-
tary concerns dominate the second phase, which was marked by national 
fiscal crises in 2000 and 2008.  These crises precipitated implementa-
tion of state-level austerity measures that prompted widespread budget 
shortfalls, with commensurate fretting and frustration.  In this phase, the 
emphasis was on documenting and publicizing the negative consequenc-
es of underfunding courts, while agitating for the respect and support 
due to a coequal branch of government.  This finance-focused phase also 
exposes a clear connection between austerity and proliferating monetary 
sanctions.  The third and current people-oriented phase stands out for 
centering both the individuals assessing monetary sanctions and those 
experiencing disproportionately negative outcomes related to difficulty 
paying them.  In the former group, judges and other practitioners ques-
tion their role as debt collectors.  In the latter, practitioners, scholars, and 
advocates for reform bring to light the harms caused by criminal justice 
debt that exceeds a person’s ability to pay.  Concern with various negative 
impacts on the court marks all three phases.  After highlighting problem-
atic aspects of monetary sanctions, this essay discusses the distinguishing 
characteristics of each phase as well as the insights to be gleaned from 
them.  The essay concludes with ideas for paths forward via increased 
translational research and improved data quality and access.
I. Monetary Sanctions and Courts
From the perspective of the courts, fines and fees are typically a 
financial necessity.  According to the National Center for State Courts, 
2. Practitioners refers to those directly involved in assessing, administrating, and/
or collecting monetary sanctions such as judges, court administrators, or attor-
neys, as well as those involved with professional organizations that develop, set, 
or promote court policy.
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of the 34 states providing information, only nine do not retain revenue 
from criminal fines or fees and/or traffic fines and fees.3  That most states 
retain money from fines and fees can be seen as a logical response to the 
fact that the average amount of the judicial branch budget as a percent of 
the state general fund is 1.84 percent.  Vermont has the highest percent of 
the general fund at 4 percent, while Tennessee and Texas are the lowest at 
0.40 percent.4  At the same time, court systems have an attenuated ability 
to advocate for themselves as only in a minority of states is the judicial 
appropriation filed as a separate bill from the overall state budget 5
The reliance on monetary sanctions creates conflicts of interest and 
problematic tradeoffs.  What can be understood as “indirect,” as opposed 
to “direct” restitution provides a useful example.  While the latter is the 
traditional form of restitution, in which a person convicted of an offense 
compensates a specific victim for bodily or property harm, the former is 
actually quite dominant in modern monetary sanction use.  Indirect res-
titution occurs when a person convicted of an offense—whether or not 
there is an identifiable victim—pays a separate fee or surcharge designat-
ed for crime victim compensation via a state fund or other mechanism.
All states receive federal funding for their Victim Compensation 
Funds, which is supported by the fines, forfeitures, and special assess-
ments levied on people convicted of federal offenses.  States also may 
have at least one surcharge or fee that goes to the state fund.  Alabama 
exemplifies how indirect restitution commonly functions.  The Alabama 
Crime Victims Compensation Fund receives $2 from each moving traf-
fic violation.  It also receives funds from an “additional court cost” for 
every misdemeanor ($10), municipal ordinance ($10), or felony ($15). 
In addition, the Fund receives the bulk of the mandatory misdemean-
or (minimum $25, maximum $1000) and felony victim assessment fees 
(minimum $50, maximum $10,000).6  With this structure, indirect resti-
tution provides 63 percent of the revenue for Alabama’s Crime Victim 
Compensation Fund, while direct restitution provides less than 5 per-
cent.7  Similar examples can be found around the country.8
3. S. Strickland et al., Funds Dedicated to the Judicial Branch: 1.4c Sources of Rev-
enue and Retention of Dedicated Funds, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Ct. (June 30, 2017), 
http://data.ncsc.org/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/
SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewisa&anonymous=true&bookmark=Document\
BM16 [https://perma.cc/6JHL-K6VN].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The Office of Prosecution Services receives the second $25 of the assessment. 
The Alabama Crime Victims’ Compensation Commission Annual Report Octo-
ber 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017, Ala. Crime Victims’ Compensation Commis-
sion, https://acvcc.alabama.gov/downloads/annualreport2017.pdf.
7. The financial summary indicates that $2,770,583 came from court fees and vic-
tim assessment fees; $206,384 came from direct restitution; which resulted in 
$4,393,487 in total receipts.  Id. at 6, 16.
8. Kansas’ VCF receives nearly 11 percent of fines, penalties and forfeitures from 
the district courts; Connecticut funds its Victims’ Compensation Assistance 
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The relevance of restitution to court funding is how monetary sanc-
tion payment is prioritized.  There is an inverse relationship between 
statutorily prioritizing payment of direct restitution and courts receiving 
funds through court costs or other sanctions that help fund the courts. 
The alternative has problems of its own.  Failing to prioritize direct resti-
tution, means that victims are less likely to ever receive the compensation 
they are due.
A comparable dynamic plays out in the domain of surcharges, where 
the origin and the destination of funds raise questions about tradeoffs, 
primarily in terms of fairness and equity.  Mississippi’s $235 criminal as-
sessment imposed on each violation of the Implied Consent Law (Miss. 
Code Ann. Section 63-11-1 et seq.), for instance, is allocated to twenty-six 
different funds including the Spinal Cord and Head Injury Trust Fund, 
the Attorney General’s Cyber-Crime Unit, and the Child Support Pros-
ecution Trust Fund.  In Nevada, the amount of a misdemeanor fine (up 
to $1000, NRS 193.150) determines the amount of the administrative as-
sessment.  The administrative assessment ranges from $30 to $120, with 
allocations going to Juvenile Courts, Municipal Courts, the State Gener-
al Fund, while the remainder is split almost equally between the Judicial 
Branch and the Executive Branch.  The revenue from Iowa’s surcharge on 
misdemeanor convictions goes primarily to its general fund, with the judi-
cial branch, cities and counties, the Prison Infrastructure Fund, and Iowa’s 
Victim Compensation Fund receiving dedicated percentages of what the 
courts collect.  This type of divvying up of surcharges is commonplace and 
highlights the potential for admirable goals (e.g. well-funded courts and 
proportional punishment) to be set in opposition to one another.
These examples demonstrate how courts are at least somewhat 
dependent on revenue from fines and fees, but that the structure of mon-
etary sanctions can be tortuous.  The next Part explores how perspective 
on court funding and the role of fines and fees has changed over time.
II. A Brief History of Concerns About Court Funding
A. Phase I “Law”: Inherent Powers & Self-Preservation (Pre-2000)
The earliest concerns with court funding were anchored in the 
doctrine of inherent judicial powers.9  The idea is that since the Consti-
tution establishes the courts as a coequal branch of government, they 
Program by levying an 18 percent surcharge on all criminal offenses, including 
motor vehicle offenses; Ohio’s VCF draws approximately 20 percent of its reve-
nue solely from a Driver’s License Reinstatement Fee; Texas has “Offender In-
mate Telephone Revenue” of which the first $10 million each year goes to the 
state’s VCF.
9. See Geoffrey C. Hazard et al, Comment, Court Finance and Unitary Budget-
ing, 81 Yale L.J. 1286 (1972); John C. Cratsley, Inherent Powers of the Courts, 
23 Nat’l Jud. C., A.B.A. at U. of Nev. (1980); Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Indepen-
dence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 
(1993).
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have license to take actions necessary to realize their constitutional du-
ties.  That is, responsibility indicates authority to pursue constitutional 
functions;10 therefore, insofar as this doctrine is a “positive safeguard of 
judicial independence,” it encompasses court budgeting.11
On this basis, early explanations of problems with court funding 
were primarily occupied with the dependence of courts on the other 
branches of government for resources.  Indeed, this is a key finding of an 
authoritative book on the mechanics of public funding for state courts 
by Carl Baar, published in 1975.  Other scholars in this era explained the 
situation as:
“Among the difficulties besetting the courts today is lack of money.  
In this respect, they share adversity with most public and charitable 
institutions such as schools, universities, hospitals, parks and libraries.  
But the fiscal dilemma of the courts is unique in certain respects.  
They constitute an independent branch of government, critically 
necessary to the balance of our constitutional system.  Yet they are 
expected to eschew the normal political process and, unlike other 
competitors for public resources, are prohibited from cultivating 
their own constituencies and utilizing lobbyists.  Furthermore, the 
judicial systems of most states are heavily dependent on local gov-
ernment for their finance”12
Because the legislative branch holds the purse strings, “[t]he tension 
in these interbranch disputes is between the need to insure the judiciary’s 
independence and the need to protect funding authorities from over-
reaching judges”.13  A long history of cases relates to the reach of inherent 
powers into the domain of courthouse budgets and facilities,14 with gener-
al support for the court’s right to expend funds it deems necessary.
Scholars in this pre-2000 era cited a variety of causes of reduced 
court funds, such as decreasing federal funds,15 economic downturns, 
10. Hazard, supra note 9 at 1287.
11. G. Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the 
Purse, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 Judicature 12,14 (2004).
12. Hazard, supra note 9, at 1286.
13. Jackson, supra note 9, at 220.
14. Ex parte Turner, 40 Ark. 548 (1883); Bd. of Comm’rs of Vigo Cty. v. Stout, 136 
Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683 (1893); State v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902) (facilities); 
State v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962 (1909); Neosho Cty. Comm’rs v. 
Stoddart, 13 Kan. 207, 211 (1874) (facilities); Wichita Cty. v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 
253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Bass v. Saline Cty., 171 Neb. 538, 106 N.W.2d 860 
(1960); Pena v. Dist. Court of Second Judicial Dist. In & For City & Cty. of Den-
ver, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1984) (facilities); Knuepfer v. Fawell, 96 Ill. 2d 284, 449 
N.E.2d 1312 (1983); Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789 (Miss. 1988); Matter of Ala-
mance Cty. Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991); Wachtler v. Cuo-
mo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County filed Sept. 27, 1991); see Howard B. 
Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 14 Pace L. Rev. 111, 
122–135 (1994) for overview of Wachtler v. Cuomo.
15. For a discussion of the effect of federal funding in Iowa and Nevada, see Karin 
D. Marin, Monetary Myopia: An Examination of Institutional Response to Reve-
nue From Monetary Sanctions for Misdemeanors, 29 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 630 
(2018).
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increasing caseloads related to the war on drugs, and reliance on local 
versus state funding.16  Interestingly, increased fines and fees were not 
generally considered as a plausible solution at that time.  In fact, one 
article of the era asserts that “[t]he courts’ oldest method of raising rev-
enue—charging fees for their services—is now substantially unavailable 
and unavailing.  Clearly this is so in criminal cases, where most defen-
dants are more or less without money”.17  This quote is notable both for 
acknowledgement of courts historically raising fees for self-preservation 
as well as for the prescient view that attempting to raise revenue from 
impoverished defendants would be ineffective.
Practitioners were active on the topic in this era as well.  Perennial 
concern with underfunded courts prompted the State Justice Institute 
to launch an initiative leading to the National Interbranch Conference 
on Funding the State Courts in the mid-1990s.  In 1995, a conference was 
held with the following objectives:
“ . . . to encourage interbranch strategic planning and joint venturing 
to foster communication and a common purpose with regard to State 
court resources; to increase the awareness of government officials 
and the public about State court resource needs; and to encourage 
innovative approaches to meeting State court resource needs, more 
effective use of existing resources, and more reliable and specific 
ways of measuring operational needs of State courts”18
Among the eight topics discussed were “interbranch relations in financial 
matters, . . . State court funding sources, fine and fee collection by State 
courts, court budgeting improvements, [and] technology and facilities as 
major change factors . . . ”19  In terms of monetary sanctions, improving 
collection was the main goal, rather than expanded use.  The overarching 
question was simply how to ensure adequate resources for courts, in light 
of their relationship with the State.
Pre-2000, concern with court funding was typically expressed as a 
constitutional matter.  While budget shortfalls occurred, and the reces-
sion in the 1990’s exacerbated the issue, scholars and practitioners argued 
in the realm of law.  The core of the question was about discerning the 
line between judicial and legislative authority and responsibility.  Mon-
etary sanctions were barely a consideration, either as a solution or as a 
problem.  That changed in the next phase.
16. Walter E. Swearingen, Wachtler v. Cuomo: Does New York’s Judiciary Have an 
Inherent Right of Self-Preservation?, 14 Pace L. Rev. 153 (1994); Jackson, supra 
note 9; Hazard, supra note 9.
17. Hazard, supra note 9, at 1289.
18. R. W. Tobin, Funding the State Courts: Issues and Approaches—Final Report on 
the National Interbranch Conference on Funding the State Courts—Serving the 
People Together, Nat’l Crim. Just. Reference Serv. (1996).
19. Id.
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B. Phase II “Money”: Fiscal Austerity & Monetary Sanction 
Expansion (2000–2015)
“It is axiomatic that the core functions of our government are sup-
ported from basic and general tax revenues.  Government exists and 
operates for the common good based upon a common will to be governed, 
and the expense thereof is borne by general taxation of the governed”.20 
This quote from a Conference of State Court Administrators (COSCA) re-
port titled “Courts Are Not Revenue Centers” perfectly encapsulates the 
tenor of the second phase of concern with court funding.21  The fiscal crisis, 
precipitated by the collapse of the dotcom bubble in 2000, separates the 
first from the second phase.  The collapse of the mortgage industry in 2008 
further delineates this phase.  Each incident prompted additional cuts to 
court funding with the attendant consternation from academics and court 
professionals alike.  While the perpetual concerns of dependence on the 
other branches for funding persist in this era, it is at this point that mone-
tary sanctions emerge as a popular solution to budgeting shortfalls.
Statistics such as the following raised the alarm: “In the 2010 fis-
cal year, 40 state court budgets were cut, and for the 2011 fiscal year, 48 
project budget cuts”.22  Scholarly and practitioner-oriented publications in 
this era make statements such as: “[a]cross the country, courts are being 
asked to do more with less”;23 “[t]he current fiscal crisis is provoking bud-
get reductions so deep they threaten the basic mission of state courts”;24 
and, “[t]he courts of our country are in crisis.”25  The connection between 
state budgets and court funding was clear.  For example, the Conference 
of State Court Administrators’ “Position Paper on State Judicial Branch 
Budgets in Times of Fiscal Crisis” begins by asserting that “State govern-
ments today are experiencing the worst fiscal crisis in many decades”.26
The important backdrop to this and the previous phase is the rise of 
mass incarceration.  As the prison population skyrocketed more than 500 
percent between 1980 and 2000,27 the sheer size of the system demanded 
20. Carl Reynolds & Jeff Hall, 2011–2012 Policy Paper: Courts Are Not Revenue 
Centers, Conf. of St. Ct. Admin. (2012), https://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/ Microsites/
Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/CourtsAreNotRevenueCenters- Final.ashx.
21. Position Paper on State Judicial Branch Budgets in Times of Fiscal Crisis, 
Conf. of St. Ct. Admin. (2003), https://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/ 
COSCA/Policy%20Papers/BudgetWhitePaper.ashx.
22. Richard Y. Schauffler & Matthew Kleiman, State Courts and the Budget Crisis: 
Rethinking Court Services, The Book of the States 2010, at 42.
23. Joseph P. Nadeau, Ensuring Adequate Long-Term Funding for Courts: Recom-
mendations from the ABA Commission on State Court Funding, 43 Judges’ J. 15 
(2004).
24. Schauffler & Kleiman, supra note 22.
25. American Bar Association Task Force on the Preservation of the Justice 
System, Report to the House of Delegates (2011).
26. Reynolds & Hall, supra note 20 at 2.
27. The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections (Jun. 2019), 
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US- 
Corrections.pdf.
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more output with fewer resources.  The issues in the New York Court 
of Appeals case Maron v. Silver are emblematic of the problem.28  The 
state’s judges sought a higher salary because their pay had not increased 
in eleven years.  As their salaries were effectively reduced by 30 percent 
in that time frame by inflation and rising costs of living, their/the court’s 
case dockets increased by 30 percent.29
Practitioners, in particular, tended to see three possible respons-
es to budget shortfalls: cutting costs, improving efficiency, and increasing 
revenues.30  It follows that increasing fees, fines, and costs were seen as 
“viable”.31  In that vein, practitioner-oriented publications deemed certain 
responses to funding issues successful and worthy of propagating.  For 
instance, in summer 2004,  The Judges’ Journal published a special edi-
tion with the theme of “Judicial Independence, Funding the Courts, and 
Interbranch Relations” focused on “the challenges and responsibilities of 
funding the nation’s courts”.32  The edition includes a number of examples 
of expanded monetary sanctions and the rationale for doing so.
One article, whose authors were affiliated with the National Cen-
ter for State Court, explains that “[m]any states have opted for new or 
increased court costs or intensified their collection efforts during the 
current recession”.33  Judge Jonathan Lippman, then the chief adminis-
trative judge of the New York State Unified Court System, asserted that 
New York “raised court fees and fines to increase revenue”.34  Similarly, 
the chief justice of the Michigan Supreme Court reported that the court 
successfully generated increased revenue with new levies and improved 
efficiencies in apportioning assessments.35  An Arizona court administra-
tor writes that “[c]utbacks in state funding to the court and the county 
have been largely absorbed within the county’s budget, counterbalanced 
by revenues from the new user fees, and offset by the court’s fiscal re-
straint”.36  These examples show how practitioners espoused monetary 
sanctions out of concern with court funding.
Around the same time, the National Center for State Courts gen-
erated a comprehensive list of “revenue generation strategies, including 
enhanced collection of uncollected fines, penalties and surcharges 
28. Matter of Maron v. Silver, 14 N.Y.3d 230 (2010).
29. American Bar Association Task Force, supra note 25.
30. Daniel J. Hall, Robert W. Tobin, & Kenneth G. Pankey, Jr., Balancing Judicial In-
dependence and Fiscal Accountability in Times of Economic Crisis, 43 Judges’ J. 
6 (2004).
31. Reynolds & Hall, supra note 20, at 12.
32. John K. Hudzik, Judicial Independence, Funding the Courts, and Interbranch Re-
lations. 43 Judges J. 1 (2004).
33. Hall, Tobin, & Pankey, supra note 30, at 8.
34. Jonathan Lippman, New York’s Efforts to Secure Sufficient Court Resources in 
Lean Times, 43 Judges J. 21, 22 (2004).
35. Maura D. Corrigan, Finding Revenue in Hard Times: The Michigan Judiciary’s 
Approach. 43 Judges J. 24 (2004).
36. Marcus W. Reinkensmeyer, Court Budget Strategies: Stewardship, Accountability, 
and Partnership in Maricopa County. 43 Judges J. 38, 40 (2004).
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through interception and garnishment of federal and state income tax 
returns, suspension of vehicle licenses or registrations, and institution of 
mail and credit card payment methods”.37  This list reflects how focusing 
on collection efforts accompanied enthusiasm for monetary sanctions as 
a source of financial support for courts.  Altogether, this phase of concern 
with court funding situates courts’ budget challenges as an outcome of 
shrinking state budgets due to larger macroeconomic factors.  In this con-
text, additional (or increased) monetary sanctions are seen as a way to 
generate funds for beleaguered courts.  Professional associations spread 
the word and high-powered practitioners embrace the trend.  Yet the 
response on a national scale was insufficient to avoid the repercussions 
from a second economic downturn.
The financial crisis of 2008 prompted another round of court bud-
get reductions.  Soon thereafter, in 2010, the American Bar Association 
formed a “Task Force on the Preservation of the Justice System” that was 
designed to to address some of the most critical issues facing the legal 
profession today: the severe underfunding of our justice system, deple-
tion of resources, and the courts’ struggle to render their constitutional 
function and provide access to justice for countless Americans.38  The 
following year, the ABA held public hearings;39 there was a national sym-
posium on “court underfunding;” and the ABA held a forum on the topic 
at its midyear meeting.40  The Kentucky Law Journal dedicated most of 
its 2011–2012 (Vol. 100) issue to the Symposium on State Court Funding. 
In 2013, the New England Law Review published a symposium of articles 
under the title of “Crisis in the Judiciary,” which explored similar themes.
In this period, the issue was largely framed in terms of reductions 
in courts’ ability to provide services, in part based on a 2011 survey con-
ducted by the National Center on State Courts.41  The survey found that 
42 states cut judicial funding, 27 increased court fines and fees, 23 reduced 
court hours, and around 70 percent had various staffing vacancies.42  Au-
thors (both scholars and judges) detailed the budget crisis and proposed 
options ranging from state constitutional protections43 to addressing the 
lack of public knowledge about the judiciary.44  In 2012, the Conference 
of State Court Administrators reported that, while the previous four 
37. Reynolds & Hall, supra note 20, at 14.
38. American Bar Association Task Force, supra note 25.
39. Held in May 2011 at the University of New Hampshire School of Law, see 
Shortfall in Court Budgets Directly Impact Public, National Center for State 
Courts (May 25, 2011), https://www.ncsc.org/newsroom/backgrounder/2011/
court-budgets.aspx.
40. American Bar Association Task Force, supra note 25.
41. Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium on State Court Funding: Keynote Address, 100 
Kentucky L.J. 743 (2011).
42. Id.
43. G. Alan Tarr, No Exit: The Financial Crisis Facing State Courts. 100 Kentucky 
L.J. 785 (2011).
44. Michael L. Buenger, Do We Have 18th Century Courts for the 21st Century?, 100 
Kentucky L.J. 833 (2011).
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years had been “particularly difficult,” appropriations to most state court 
systems increased slightly for fiscal year 2013.  Yet, more than a third of 
states reported that responses to inadequate budgets resulted in reduced 
service to the public and more than a quarter reported that these re-
sponses led to limited access to court services.45  These reports signified 
a slight shift in emphasis from constitutional framing in the prior phase 
toward highlighting what budget challenges prevent courts from doing.
The nod toward outcomes for justice preview what emerges as a 
central theme in the next phase.  Some evidence suggests that the risks of 
using fines and fees to generate revenue were clear to practitioners in this 
era.  For example, the Funding Alternatives Work Group in Washington 
State advised against using these sanctions to support funding for the 
trial courts because, among other reasons: “Fines and penalties should 
be set on the basis of the appropriateness of the punishment, not the 
revenue potential.  Judges are placed in an inherent conflict of interest 
in determining the appropriate punishment for the offense on one hand 
and raising revenue for the courts on the other”.46  Others echoed a de-
sire to avoid potential conflicts.  The ABA Commission on State Court 
Funding, for instance, urged “a predictable general funding stream for 
the courts—one that is not tied to fee generation”.47
Even as courts expanded the use of monetary sanctions, awareness 
of likely disparate impacts existed.  Kansas Chief Justice Kay McFarland 
was heralded for the great financial success of an “Emergency Surcharge” 
she implemented in response to chronic underfunding.48  An overview 
of the surcharge indicates that the “additional costs appear to be most 
acutely felt by low-income people, that is, by minorities and other dis-
advantaged groups for whom legal services and legal access are already 
problematic” as well as noting that the one-year surcharge was still in 
place two years later.49  Similarly, the Conference of State Court Adminis-
trators, in its recommendations for increasing revenue with fines and fees, 
identified the potential of reducing access for low income individuals as 
just one among other concerns; the central concern still being apprehen-
sion about promulgating the idea that courts should be self-funding.50
45. Conference of State Court Administrators, The 2012 Budget Survey of 
State Court Administrators 4 (2012), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/
PDF/Information%20and%20Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/
COSCA%20Budget%20Survey%20Summary%202012%20with%20Tables.
ashx.
46. Court Funding Task Force, Bd. for Judicial Admin., Justice in Jeopardy: 
The Court Funding Crisis in Washington State 58 (2004), https://www.courts.
wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_bja/wgFinal/wgFinal.pdf.
47. Joseph P. Nadeau, Ensuring Adequate Long-Term Funding for Courts: Recom-
mendations from the ABA Commission on State Court Funding, 43 Judges’ J. 15, 
16 (2004).
48. Cristel E. Marquardt, Changing the Judicial Budget Process in Kansas, 43 Judg-
es’ J. 27, 27–28 (2004).
49. Id. at 29.
50. Reynolds & Hall, supra note 20, at 12–14.
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An emphasis on responding to fiscal austerity resulting from broad-
er economic downturns characterizes the second phase of concern with 
court funding.  Courts reacted to shrinking budgets during economic 
downturns by drawing attention to their subsequent curtailed services 
and capacity.  Practitioners increasingly viewed monetary sanctions as 
a promising way to generate the revenue the courts so sorely needed. 
Although there was some awareness of the potential for additional mon-
etary sanctions to place an undue burden on low income people, the 
promise of revenue dominated.  That the relative weight of impact of 
fines and fees on people versus revenue generation appears to have shift-
ed makes the next phase remarkable.
C. Phase III: “People” Debtor’s Prisons & Beyond (2015–present)
In August, 2014, White police officer Darren Wilson shot unarmed 
African American Michael Brown, Jr. in Ferguson, Missouri.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation of the shooting 
that year and, in 2015, published an unsparing report on the efforts of city 
officials, police officers executives, and the court to collect revenue from 
impoverished local residents.51  Because the report was the first of its kind 
and documented in great detail how municipal court practices caused 
undue harm to African American residents, it functions as a turning point 
in the history of concerns about court funding.  The report explains the 
excessive burden law enforcement and court practices placed on people 
living in poverty.  Just as the shooting became a touchstone for reform 
advocates (including impact litigators, national advocacy groups, and 
community-based organizations), the DOJ report became a point of ref-
erence for scholars and practitioners on the potential for harm from fines 
and fees.  As such, the incident and the report mark the beginning of the 
current phase of concern with court funding.
In this phase, the people most affected by the expanded use of mon-
etary sanctions feature prominently.  With an evergrowing catalogue of 
work by scholars and reform advocates on the topics of monetary sanc-
tions and criminal justice debt, practitioners became increasingly aware 
of and vocal about the pitfalls of fines and fees.  Attempts to rely on 
defendants to fund the judicial branch came to be seen as increasingly 
problematic—both for defendants and the courts themselves.
In 2016, COSCA released a Policy Paper, “The End of Debtor’s Pris-
ons” that provided a number of guidelines and best practices aimed toward 
improving people’s ability to comply with court-ordered monetary sanc-
tions and thereby “minimize [their] negative impact”.52  That same year, the 
51. U.S. Dep’t Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Po-
lice Department (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press- 
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
52. Arthur W. Pepin, Policy & Liaison Comm., The End of Debtors’ Prisons: Effec-
tive Court Policies for Successful Compliance with Legal Financial Obligations, 
Conference of State Court Adm’rs 27 (2016), https://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/End-of-Debtors-Prisons-2016.ashx.
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Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Adminis-
trators formed the National Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail Practices 
(The Task Force).  Because of its authoritative status, breadth of stakehold-
ers, and ability to reach judges around the country, the Task Force serves as 
an important voice in the field.  The Task Force has since produced a vari-
ety of tools “to help courts improve their practices in this area,” including 
a bench card, model legislation, sample language, sample court rules.  Most 
telling are two of its principles related to monetary sanctions:
Principle 1.5 Court Funding and Legal Financial Obligations
“Courts should be entirely and sufficiently funded from general gov-
ernmental revenue sources to enable them to fulfill their mandate.  
Core court functions should not be supported by revenues generated 
from Legal Financial Obligations.”
Principle 1.6 Fees and Surcharges: Nexus to the “Administration 
of Justice”
“While situations occur where user fees and surcharges may be nec-
essary, such fees and surcharges should always be minimized and 
should never fund activities outside the justice system.  Fees and 
surcharges should be established only for “administration of justice” 
purposes.  “Administration of justice” should be narrowly defined 
and in no case should the amount of such a fee or surcharge ex-
ceed the actual cost of providing the service.  The core functions of 
courts, such as personnel and salaries, should be funded by general 
tax revenues.”
Among the comprehensive set of principles, these two alone distill 
the main ideas of decades of concern about court funding as they relate 
to fines and fees.  The inherent powers doctrine undergirds the notion 
of the court “fulfilling their mandate” in Principle 1.5, but now that con-
cept is linked explicitly with a denunciation of doing so via monetary 
sanctions in Principle 1.6.  Similarly, condemning the use of monetary 
sanctions as a substitute for tax revenues reinforces an established idea 
about courts being funded by the general public.
The concerns of this phase manifest in other forms as well.  In 2017, 
the practitioner-oriented journal, Trends in State Courts, focused on fines, 
fees, and bail.53  Articles challenged using driver’s license suspensions 
for nonpayment of fines and fees;54 provided insight from sitting judges 
on the issue;55 and, offered guidance on how courts can assess their use 
53. Maureen O’Connor & Laurie K. Dudgeon, The Work of the National Task Force 
on Fines, Fees and Bail Practices, in Trends in State Courts 2017 59 (Debo-
rah W. Smith et al., eds., 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/
Trends%202017/Trends-2017-Final-small.ashx.
54. See Andrea M. Marsh, Rethinking Driver’s License Suspensions for Nonpayment 
of Fines and Fees, in Trends in State Courts 2017 20 (Deborah W. Smith et 
al., eds., 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Trends%202017/
Trends-2017-Final-small.ashx.
55. See Elizabeth Hines, View from the Michigan Bench, Trends in State Courts 
35 (2017) (Deborah W. Smith et al., eds., 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/Trends%202017/Trends-2017-Final-small.ashx.; see also Ed 
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of monetary sanctions.   That same year, the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights held hearings and published a report on “Targeted Fines and Fees 
Against Communities of Color: Civil Rights & Constitutional Implica-
tions”.56  Also in 2017, the National Task Force disseminated its bench card 
for judges to use when assessing fines and fees, based on a proposal made 
at a meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices.57
This practitioner and policymaker attention to the costs of mone-
tary sanctions sets this phase apart from previous ones.  While scholars and 
reform advocates have been prolific on the topic of fines and fees in this 
phase, the view of practitioners sheds most light on how concern with court 
funding currently presents.  The events in Ferguson launched extensive 
self-reflection in terms of how courts participate in attempts to generate 
revenue from the people who unwillingly come into contact with them. 
The shift in seeing fines and fees as a potential revenue source to under-
standing their social costs marks an important change in rhetoric around 
court funding.  As the current era unfolds, translating the awareness of the 
harms of criminal justice debt into more equitable policy would be eased 
by improvements on two fronts: improved data and translational research.
III. Moving Forward: Data Improvements and Translational 
Research
A major hindrance to reform is the profound lack of knowledge 
and transparency in some jurisdictions.  Improved data quality and access 
to data could significantly advance reform efforts.  In the domain of court 
funding, many important open questions remain about the dynamics be-
tween legislative decisionmaking, court autonomy, and criminal justice 
debt.  Given that so many jurisdictions grapple with these issues, there is, 
in fact, an abundance of data; the difficulty is in collecting and obtaining 
those data.  It would be valuable to know, for instance, how an addi-
tional surcharge or a higher fee affects not just revenue, but collection 
rates.  Such an endeavor would require diligent tracking of assessments 
and collections as well as transparency in budgeting.  Specifically, mone-
tary sanctions are often aggregated (e.g. “fees” includes public defender 
fees, court costs, victim fees, DNA fees, etc.) such that following a single 
Spillane, View from the Texas Bench, Trends in State Courts 41 (2017) (Deb-
orah W. Smith et al., eds., 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/
Trends%202017/Trends-2017-Final-small.ashx.
56. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Targeted Fines and Fees Against Communities 
of Color: Civil Rights & Constitutional Implications (2017), https://www.us-
ccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf.
57. See Nat’l Task Force on Fines, Fees & Bail Practices, Principles on Fines, 
Fees, and Bail Practices (2019), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/ 
Topics/Fines%20and%20Fees/Principles%201%2017%2019.ashx; see Nat’l 
Task Force on Fines, Fees & Bail Practices, Resolution 3: Encouraging Ed-
ucation on and Use of the Bench Card on Lawful Collection of Court- 
Imposed Legal Financial Obligations (2017), https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/ media/
Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/02012017-Encouraging-Education-Use-
Bench-Card- Lawful-Collection.ashx.
226 2020:213C J LR
fee becomes functionally impossible.  Truly understanding the nature of 
the monetary sanction beast will require a keen level of detail that court 
financial reporting can obscure.
Collaborative research between practitioners and academics stands 
to generate work useful to both groups.  Specifically, translational re-
search bridges the gap between lab-based academic research and the 
real world in which practitioners grapple daily with issues of shared con-
cern.  Rather than existing in isolation and remove from the processes 
academics investigate, translational research entails a deeply cooperative 
approach to identifying, asking, and addressing research questions.  This 
approach, however, can be more costly, prone to being a theoretical, and 
more logistically difficult than traditional research.58  However, the abil-
ity to conduct highly relevant and timely research, with near immediate 
insights for practitioners arguably outweighs these concerns.
Moving forward with translational research requires a willingness 
to engage across institutional boundaries with patience and flexibility.  It 
also requires respect for institutional constraints (e.g. data security and 
human subjects protections) and an openness to navigating hurdles in 
partnership.  Finally, this type of research demands support for producing 
deliverables that may meet the needs of only a subset of collaborators at 
a time (e.g. an interim report for elected officials versus a peer-reviewed 
academic article).  This approach is an excellent way to leverage maximal 
knowledge of the different areas of expertise that academics and practi-
tioners bring to the table.
Conclusion
While court funding is a perennial issue, expanded use of and 
overreliance on monetary sanctions for revenue weaves a new strand of 
concern into a longstanding issue.  This essay articulates the three phases 
of concern with court funding—law, monetary, and people-based con-
cerns—exploring the role of monetary sanctions in each.  The shifts in 
how scholars and, especially, practitioners view court funding has several 
implications for policy.  First, we should anticipate yet another change 
in perspective.  Given the significant momentum around advocacy for 
reform in monetary sanctions and related areas like bail, the next phase 
will likely reflect the impact of these efforts.  Second, professional asso-
ciations, and collaborations in particular, have potential to significantly 
influence discourse and practice.  Moving forward, reform efforts that 
tailor messages and empirical information for these audiences could be 
momentous.  Third, and relatedly, improved data and openness to part-
nering with researchers stands to provide the type of evidence necessary 
to attract the attention of policymakers.  By harnessing collective concern 
with the status quo of monetary sanctions, joint efforts would be poised 
to alter the landscape of fines and fees.
58. Phillip Atiba Goff, et al., (The Need for) A Model of Translational Mind Science 
Justice Research, 1 J. Soc. & Pol. Psychol. 385 (2013).
